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In this paper, we analyze the current status of securitization in Spain within a global context, and taking in account certain factors 
that have had or may have impact on its recent development and its future. After explaining the historical and legislative 
evolution, the paper highlights the substantial change that securitization has undergone since the beginnings of the financial crisis, 
changing from a model of "originate, securitize and distribute" to another model of "originate, securitize and hold".Finally, some 
related factors that may affect the future of securitization are analyzed, stressing the perception of an increasing Spanish sovereign 
risk, and concluding with the need to improve the control that supervisors must exercise on banks and rating agencies in order to 
transmit credibility to investors.  
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PERSPECTIVES ON THE SECURITIZATION OF ASSETS: THE SPANISH CASE 
 
1. Introduction  
There is no doubt that securitization can be considered as one of the principal causes of the 
current financial crisis, which began in 2007 and shows no reliable signs of ending, in Spain. It is 
no coincidence that the first symptoms of the bursting of the property bubble - the crashing in 
July of that year of two hedge funds that specialised in mortgages of Bear Stearns - were closely 
associated with the phenomenon of securitization. The drop in rating suffered by the triple A 
tranches of those securitizations, whose underlying assets were sub-prime mortgages, made their 
quoted prices extremely volatile. 
Pre-existing factors, such as excessive indebtedness, the demonstrated interconnection of the 
capital markets and the systemic risk entailed by that (Losada, 2006), have propitiated the crisis. 
In addition, the myopia associated with "short-termism" in the expectation of results, incorrectly-
assigned credit ratings, and the lax approach of the supervisors are other factors to consider. 
Lastly, the paradigm on which securitization has been based (“originate in order to distribute”, 
instead of “originate in order to hold”, as stated by Roldán, 2009) has acted as a catalyzer in 
bringing about the expansion of a crisis whose effects have still not come fully to light today, nor 
been fully quantified. This is demonstrated by the open debate taking place about how to control 
the risk of those entities that the markets, rightly or wrongly, now consider too big to fail. Figure 
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Figure 1: Ibex 35, Eurostoxx 50 and Dow Jones: Total returns compared, in percentage 







Source: Expansion, 14-8-2009, with information from Bloomberg. 
The Bank of Spain has upheld a criterion of maximum prudence in its regulation, and has 
demanded, among other requirements, anti-cyclical provisions in boom times, and prohibited off-
balance sheet securitizations. In addition, the financial entities have maintained an almost zero 
exposure to sub-prime assets, and the regulator has submitted them to close supervision. But, 
despite this, our country has in no way escaped unscathed from the international penalization of 
the market for securitization bonds that, as will be confirmed later, has resulted in a practically 
total drought of new issues. And so a financial tool that, in other circumstances, had been 
demonstrated to be extremely useful in the expansion of the banking business, was suddenly 
revealed to be a dangerous weapon for the transmission of credit risk whose power, given the 
globalization of financial markets, turned out to be lethal. 
In this study an analysis is made of securitization in Spain, aiming to set it in its European and 
global context. With this object, we will deal with the following points:  
  In the next section the recent evolution of securitization, within and beyond our borders, 
will be described and discussed. 
In the year    In the rally  
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  In the third section, the pertinent legislation will be reviewed. 
  We will continue, in the fourth part, presenting the current composition of the 
international markets for debt and the role that securitization has played. 
  Then, in the fifth part, the current situation of some of the factors that may affect the 
future of securitization will be considered. 
  Finally we will present, succinctly, some of the conclusions that can be drawn from this 
article. 
 
2. Recent evolution 
At the beginning of the 1970's, the first securitizations based on residential mortgages appeared 
in the USA. These are known as MBS or mortgage-backed securities, and this type of instrument 
evolved into extremely sophisticated financial structures that few, apart from a very small elite, 
understood very well. The securitization of credits had become, in few years, an operation taken 
as a reference in international financing for stimulating growth unrestricted by any risk that might 
be inherent in such instruments. 
Starting from relatively simple products that replicated the income flows from the underlying 
mortgages on which they were based (known as pass-through securities) up to the complex 
derivative instruments in which only risk is transferred (synthetic securitization) and others that 
transform previous securitizations into a new instrument (collateralized-debt obligations or 
CDOs), the development of securitization could well be described as vertiginous. Because of the 
huge amount of assets thus transformed, the wide range of types of underlying credit, the variety 
of different instruments or securities that have come to be traded, the so-called financial  
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engineering utilised, and the apparently unstoppable international growth in its use, securitization 
is one of the most prominent financial phenomena of our times. 
Securitization began in the UK in 1987 and in France in 1989, and reached Spain in the early 
1990's. Although it is true that previous attempts had been made by some banking entities to 
issue securitization bonds (Barranechea, González and Trujillo, 2007), Spain lacked a specific 
legal framework to serve as an "umbrella" for the correct development and operation of this 
market.  
The first Spanish regulation in this field concerned the securitization of mortgage loans, since 
these constitute very appropriate assets for this purpose due to their long term of amortization and 
the regularity of their payment flows. The Law 19/1992, under which Property Investment Funds 
and Companies and Mortgage Securitization Funds were regulated, enabled the securitization 
market to get started with an initially slow but thereafter continuous development. 
Subsequently, with the promulgation of the Royal Decree 926/1998, which made securitization 
feasible for other types of loans, and even for future cash flows, the growth of the market 
accelerated, although due not only to the emergence of this regulation but also to other reasons.  
With monetary policy centralised in the hands of the European Central Bank, which entered into 
force on 1 January 1999, the system of guarantees in the form of securities for accessing the 
Central Bank auctions for the injection of liquidity was institutionalised, with securitization 
bonds constituting acceptable assets for this purpose. In addition to this reason, the spectacular 
boom in the mortgage market, fed by low interest rates and easy credit that weakened the 
perception of risk (Brunnermeier, 2009), led to a parallel increase of the mortgage credits that 
was reflected in the issues of securitization bonds. Consequently, the volume in circulation in 
Spain, in 2007, reached the record figure of 141,750 million euros.  
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During the intervening years, between 1999 and 2007, the balance of these securities in 
circulation grew at rates of increase unknown until now, while international investors were 
demonstrating great interest in these products that were flooding onto the market. This voracious 
demand by investors provided the financing for a good part of the economic growth enjoyed by 
Spain during this period.  












Source: Intermoney Securitization and CNMV. 
The rapid growth presented by these issues in the period 1999 - 2007 can be readily appreciated 
in figure 2; in some years inter-annual growth rates of 95% were achieved, and 2007 showed a 
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After this spectacular performance, the bankruptcy of the investment bank Lehman Brothers, in 
September 2008, released a huge wave of uncertainty, based on the lack of transparency in the 
investments made in securitizations; it was like a tsunami that travelled swiftly and implacably all 
around the world. The falls in trading suffered during the years 2008 and 2009, left this market 
practically in dry dock, since, although securitizations continued to be issued, hardly any of them 
could be placed in the market, and so they had to remain on the balance sheets of the issuers 
themselves; we will deal with this situation in the fourth part of this paper.  
One of the first consequences of the crisis, which broke, as already mentioned, in September 
2008, was the phenomenon of contagion, understood as an intense perception of credit risk that 
spread to many countries. In this stage, the sovereign risk of Spain increased spectacularly. 
Taking as the indicator of this situation the differential in the bono-bund returns, it can be seen, in 
figure 3 and in chart 1, how this differential almost tripled in the six months following the demise 
of Lehman, indicating a proportionate increase in the cost of financing the country. The foregoing 
represented an additional threat, in respect of its extension to Spanish companies, since the 
interest rate differential for sovereign risk acts as a lower limit, marking a minimum spread for 
the issues of debt of the national companies.  
Another indicator of the situation was given by the premiums of Credit Default Swaps (CDS's), 
which, during the same period of time, increased by more than 286%, to reach a level of 170 
basis points, against the level of 44.1 where they were before the bankruptcy of the American 
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Source: Expansión (11-8-2009). 
Looking at a larger geographic area, considering the situation within Europe, the results were not 
that different from the outcome in Spain, as can be confirmed in charts 1 and 2.  
Situating the Spanish market for securitizations in the European context, as a prior step, we 
observe in figure 4 that, according to the European Securitization Forum (ESF), Spain occupies 
third place, in the ranking of countries by volume of securitization issues within Europe, 
accounting for 16.08%, similar to Italy and only exceeded significantly by the United Kingdom.  
Including the USA in the analysis, as the world's leading issuer of securitizations, Spanish issues 
recently accounted for 3.66% at the global level. 
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* Third quarter 
** Multinational: includes all the categories in which the assets originate from a variety of 
jurisdictions or countries, whose total amounts are small. 
Source: European Securitization Forum (ESF). 
Within Europe, as in Spain, after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, the market for securitizations 
suffered a severe setback, from the panic generated (figure 5). The subsequent bank rescues, in 
both the USA and Europe, together with the reconversion of North American investment banking 
into commercial banking, ignited a fire that charred the mechanism of reputational trust on which 
the banking system is founded (Van Rixtel and Romo, 2009). 
Chart 1: Indicator of sovereign risk: bond-bund differential (in basis points). 
Lehman 
Bankruptcy  Return to normality 




Spain  46.8 128.04  17/02/2009 44.5 
Germany  - -  -  - 
France  25.8 62.77  09/03/2009 19.4 
Belgium  40.9 69.2  23/10/2008 30.3 
Italy  71.5 158.56  27/01/2009 66.5 
Ireland  42.4 283.5  19/03/2009 143.7 
United 
Kingdom  40.9 54.43  29/07/2009 30.3 
Holland  25.9 86.58  17/02/2009 22.1 
Greece  79.6 300.33  12/03/2009 107.77 
Austria  36.9 136.68  18/02/2009 34 
Source: Expansión, 11-08-09. 
In about March 2009, the market touched bottom, and began to return to levels of trust more in 
accordance with those of times prior to the crisis, which was achieved around August of that 
same year. Taking, again, the CDS premiums and the bono-bund differential as indicators, we  
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can conclude that, in the first stage of upsurge of the crisis, the mean increase of the bono-bund 
differential in the principal countries of Europe exceeded 216% (see chart 1), and that the mean 
increase of CDS premiums in these same countries reached almost 670% in mid year (see chart 
2). 
Chart 2: Indicator of risk of default; CDS premiums (in basis points). 
Lehman Bankruptcy Return to normality 
   15/09/2008 
Maximum 
premium  Date 
10/08/2009 
Spain  44.1 170  17/02/2009 25 
Germany  9.8 91.85  24/02/2009  59.88 
France  13.7 97.7  06/03/2009  27.18 
Belgium  23.3 157.75  24/02/2009 37.05 
Italy  47 200.63  06/03/2009  66.62 
Ireland  34.4 398.8  17/02/2009  149.53 
United Kingdom  22.7 175  17/02/2009  56.89 
Holland  12.4 131  24/02/2009  31.74 
Greece  56.8 285.1  17/02/2009  106.62 
Austria  13.2 273  06/03/2009  63.72 
Source:  Expansión, 11-08-09. 
The later problems of unemployment and, consequently, of defaults and the widespread declines 
in property prices - in short, the general worsening of the principal macroeconomic magnitudes - 
were aggravating the situation of the international markets for securitization bonds. 
The fear of new cases of insolvent bank portfolios coming to light provoked a sharp increase in 
the margins or spreads, by which issues were remunerated, and a stagnation of these issues. Not 
only did the volume of issues fall but also investors ceased to be interested in products whose 
opacity led to them being especially avoided; as a result the new issues were left on the hands of 
the originators themselves, there being no outlet for them on the international markets. 
Nevertheless, securitizations continued to be issued since, in order to cope with the crisis of  
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liquidity, the various central banks relaxed their demands with the object of injecting liquidity 
into the interbank market, diminishing the requirements in respect of the guarantee assets that 
banks had to produce to be able to participate in the auctions for money.  










         * Third quarter  
Source: Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME), ESF, Securitization Data Report 
Q3:2009. 
In figures 6 and 7 it can be seen how these spreads widened in all the countries analysed, 
especially during the first third of 2009; in some cases, they were almost seven times greater than 
the levels prior to the crisis. The situation of Spain, in this respect, has turned out to be especially 
onerous, since it has suffered one of the heaviest penalties at the international level. 
Despite the persistence in the markets of the drought situation, signs began to be seen of the 
return to normality since, both in Spain and in other countries, new placings of issues of 
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securitization since the Lehman bankruptcy was announced, by a group of Catalan savings banks. 
Then, the third quarter of 2009 was marked by three European placings in the primary market: 
Tesco Property Finance2, an issue of CMBS (Commercial-mortgage backed securities); VCL 11, 
securities issued by Volkswagen Leasing (ABS or Assets-backed securities) and PERMM 2009-
1, a package of British RMBS (Residential-mortgage backed securities). 
 
Figure 6: Spreads of RMBS (Residential-mortgage backed securities) 











Source: Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME), ESF, Securitization monthly data 
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Source: Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME), ESF, Securitization monthly data 
supplement (January, 2010). 
Similarly, in figure 8 it can be seen that the principal issues, even during 2009, have continued to 
be those of residential mortgages.  
However, the data given above indicate that it is specifically the mortgages on commercial 
premises (CMBS) that are suffering the highest rates of default, and that are the main cause of the 
deterioration in quality of the issues in circulation, rather than residential mortgages. In the initial 
phase it was the latter that most rapidly suffered payment defaults; however the market has been 
cleaning up toxic assets of this type, residential mortgages, and now the CMBS issues are 
beginning to come to light.   
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Figure 8: Issues in Europe, by collateral, 2008 - 2009 (third quarter). 



















Source: AFME, ESF, Securitization Data Report Q3:2009. (ABS: Asset-backed securities, CDO: 
Collateralized debt obligations, CMBS: Commercial mortgage-backed securities, RMBS: 
Residential mortgage-backed securities, WBS: Whole business securitization). 
 








* Issues to 30 September, 2009.  
Source: AFME, ESF, Securitization Data Report Q3:2009.   
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The situation in US is similar to that which occurred in Europe; initially, in 2007, there was a 
slight contraction in the volume issued, which decreased by 12.6%, but that turned into a steep 
drop of 56.5% in 2008, as can be seen in figure 9. 











Source: AFME, ESF, Securitization Data Report Q3:2009. (CMBS: Commercial mortgage-
backed securities, RMBS: Residential mortgage-backed securities, MBS: Residential and 
commercial mortgage-backed securities, ABS: Asset-backed securities). Agency refers to the 
North American mortgage agencies. 
Further, the major participation in the US securitization market is accounted for by the public 
agencies (Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae), whose mortgage-backed bonds again 
constituted the greater proportion, as can be observed in figure 10. Considering these three large 
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to the TALF program (Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility) of the Federal Reserve, 
which involved purchasing mortgage securitizations. 









b) Third quarter of 2009. 
Source: Van Rixtel and Romo, 2009.   
On the world scale, excluding from the analysis the large US agencies, it can be concluded, from 
figure 12, that the gross issue of securitizations during the last decade increased five-fold in 
barely six years, from 1999 to its peak in 2006, passing from 0.5 billion dollars to more than 2.6 
billion dollars in 2006. Subsequently issues began to fall in the third quarter of 2007, and the 
decline accelerated in 2008, when the volume of securitizations was less than half of that 
recorded for 2006. 
The data demonstrate that, during the second and third quarters of 2009, world securitization 
activity has recovered from its previous minimum, due to the reactivation of the issues placed on 
the markets. The securitizations retained by the originators themselves were dramatically reduced 
in the second quarter of 2009, and stabilized during the third quarter.  
UNITED STATES AGENCIES 





Million dollars  
  17
 
D e p a r t a m e n t o   d e   
D i r e c c i ó n   d e   E m p r e s a s
D e p a r t a m e n t o   d e   
D i r e c c i ó n   d e   E m p r e s a s













Source: Van Rixtel and Romo, 2009.   (ABS: Asset-backed securities, CMBS: Commercial 
mortgage-backed securities, RMBS: Residential mortgage-backed securities, CDO: 
Collateralized-debt obligations). 
Finally, in respect of the composition of the international markets for debt, it can be appreciated, 
also in figure 12, that the issues on the global scale have mainly been mortgage securitizations, in 
particular residential mortgages (RMBS), whereas securitizations of the CDO and CMBS types 
have constituted only a very small proportion. 
In summary, securitization is a financial mechanism that has been utilised with the object of 
expanding credit, but based on attempting to disconnect it from the underlying risks implied. This 
 Q        Q        Q        Q        Q        Q       Q          Q       Q        Q 
Million dollars  
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mechanism reached very high levels of development both in Europe and in the USA, but came to 
an abrupt and destructive halt when the crisis broke. 
The opacity of these products, the incorrect credit ratings assigned to them by the principal rating 
agencies, and the absence of effective control by the competent authorities, are the factors at the 
root of the problems that have occurred. The foregoing factors, together with the dynamism of the 
originators and investors, and the large volumes traded in the market, led to a steep rise of the 
spreads required (and of the CDS premiums), which finally resulted in the de facto paralysis of 




In Spain there was no specific regulation of securitization in existence until the law 19/1992, of 7 
July, on the regime of Property Investment Funds and Companies and on Mortgage 
Securitization Funds.  
In article 5 of this Law, referring explicitly to Mortgage Securitization Funds, the first normative 
framework for the creation of such funds was presented; it required that the assets of the fund 
should comprise mortgage participations, and that its liabilities should comprise mortgage 
securitization bonds, with the condition that the net patrimonial value of the fund should be zero. 
The securitization funds, therefore, were transforming mortgage loans into fixed income 
securities; this represented a mechanism of financing that supplied greater liquidity to the market.  
With respect to the assets, since they were mortgage participations, their regulation required that 
their administration and custody should be exercised by their issuer, while the participated loans 
ceased to be computed as assets at risk on the balance sheet of the originator. But even though  
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mortgage participations were not then computed as assets at risk in the balance sheet of the 
originator, the Bank of Spain obliged the issuer to consolidate the accounts; therefore the 
mortgage securitization funds remained subjected to capital requirements and the necessary 
provisions had to be made. 
Lacking juridical personality, the law required that the funds should be administered by the so-
called "sociedades gestoras" (management companies) of mortgage securitization funds, which 
would be responsible for  constituting and monitoring them, and would protect the interests of the 
investors; they also had to request that the securities should be admitted for quotation in an 
organised official market. These companies were placed under the supervision of the Comisión 
Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV). 
The term of the mortgage participations had to be equal to that of the participated loans; the law 
also established the obligation for a credit rating to be assigned by an entity recognized by the 
CNMV. 
 The Law 40/1994, of 30 December, also deserves special mention; this was a Law regulating 
the Spanish national electrical system, not only in respect of the moratorium on new nuclear 
power station construction but also about the securitization of the State's debt with the electricity 
generating companies. 
With the Law 19/1992, which required the issue of mortgage participations if an entity wanted to 
transfer mortgage loans to a securitization fund, many restrictions were imposed, since loans 
eligible to being participated had to meet a series of strict requirements. By way of example, one 
stipulation was that any loans whose Loan to Value (LTV, the active balance of the loan, divided 
by the assessed value of the dwelling) exceeded 80%, and the flexible mortgage products whose  
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object is not the purchase of the dwelling, were excluded, although this could be utilized as a 
guarantee.  
To overcome this situation, the Financial Law 44/2002, of 24 November, defines Mortgage 
Transfer Certificates, and establishes that mortgage participations, grouped under asset 
securitization funds, may correspond to loans and credits that do not meet the requirements 
stipulated in the Law 2/1981, of 25 March, for the Regulation of the Mortgage Market, referred to 
in the preceding paragraph.  
Although synthetic securitization has hardly been developed in Spain, the Law 62/2003, of 30 
December, consisting of fiscal, administrative and social order measures, regulates this 
activity; in this type of structure, the credit risk of the assets securitized is either totally or 
partially transferred to a credit entity, an investment services company or an authorised non-
resident entity, by contracting CDS-type credit derivatives with one or more third parties. 
 
b) Royal Decrees 
With the 19/1992 law regulating Property Investment Funds and Companies and Mortgage 
Securitization Funds, the way was opened for securitization in Spain, although it was insufficient 
for the extension of securitization to credits other than mortgage loans. For that purpose, the 
Royal Decree-Law 3/1993, of 26 February, comprising urgent measures on budgetary, 
fiscal, financial and employment matters, allowed entities to securitize "others loans and credit 
rights, included those derived from leasing operations and those loans related in general to the 
activities of small and medium-size companies"; before doing so, however, the entities had first 
to have a favourable report from the CNMV and the Bank of Spain.  
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In 1998, the laws existing on this matter had become markedly out-of-phase; consequently the 
Royal Decree 926/1998, of 14 May, was promulgated; under this law the Asset 
Securitization Funds and Securitization Fund Management Companies were regulated, to 
make it possible for them to integrate not only financial assets but also other rights, including the 
concession of present and future credits; thus asset securitization funds came into existence.  
Two types of structure were configured: the closed funds, originating from the mortgage 
securitization funds, and the open funds. These latter could consist of assets or of liabilities, 
according to whether the incorporation of elements of one or other type was permitted subsequent 
to the creation of the fund. With this, the securitization of special-risk short and medium term 
flows (asset-backed commercial paper securities or ABCPS) was permitted, since they reproduce 
the structure of a financial entity (short-term financing and long-term investment) without the 
safeguards that this possesses: the mechanism of reputation and trust with the customer and the 
deposit guarantee fund, as well as the possibility of financing through the central banks, since 
these act as lenders of last resort (Roldán, 2008). ABCPS are securitization bonds supported by 
short-term company notes, and structures of this sort have had considerable development in other 
countries (Van Rixtel and Romo, 2009). 
Finally, the Royal Decree-law 6/2009, of 30 April, in which particular measures in the 
energy sector were adopted, and the social bond, which provided for the constitution of the so-
called Fund for Securitization of the Electricity System Deficit, was approved. The object 
pursued with this fund was the financing of the tariff deficit. This tariff deficit occurs because the 
income obtained by the electricity companies does not cover the real costs of generation and 
distribution. These income flows originate from the tariffs regulated by the central Government 
and those fixed in the liberalized market.   
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According to this Royal Decree, the assets of the securitization fund will be constituted by: 
a. Rights to payment generated and not ceded to third parties by their initial owners, up to 10,000 
million euros to the date of 31 December 2008.  
b. The rights to payment deriving from the financing of the deficits generated from 1 January 
2009 until 31 December 2012, whose characteristics, including price and conditions of cession, 
will be established by Royal Decree. 
In October 2009 the entity to adjudicate the securitization operation was chosen:  this was TdA 
(Titulización de Activos), a management company in which the following savings banks 
participated: Caja Madrid, Caja Castilla la Mancha, Ibercaja, Unicaja, Caja de Burgos, EBN and 
Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo, each with a holding of 12.86%, together with J.P. Morgan, 
which held 10%. 
 
c) Orders 
With respect to the credits to SMEs, the Order of the Ministerio de Economia, of 28 May 
1999, covered Agreements for the Promotion of Asset Securitization Funds in order to 
facilitate company financing; this Order allowed financial entities to securitize both mortgage 
and non-mortgage loans, and provided a State guarantee for such securitizations in exchange for 
the entity's commitment to reinvest the liquidity thus obtained in the financing of small and 
medium-size companies.  
In addition, although the Royal Decree 926/1998 allowed the securitization of future cash flows, 
it only referred explicitly to the rights possessed by motorway concessionaires to charge and 
receive motorway tolls. Therefore a subsequent normative extension of the decree was necessary. 
In this respect, the Order EHA/3536/2005, of 10 November, widened the future credit rights  
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that were eligible for incorporation in asset securitization funds; it also authorized the Comision 
Nacional del Mercado de Valores to dictate specific rules in matters of accounting and obligatory 
disclosure of information applicable to asset securitization funds and to their management 
companies. The requirement is that the cession of the future credit rights must be full and 
unconditional, and whatever contracts to that effect that may be necessary must be signed. 
The flows regulated by this Order are the following: 
- The right of the property lessor to receive the rent payments due by virtue of the letting contract.  
- The fruits or products derived from all or some of the rights of exploitation of a work or 
performance protected by the Law of Intellectual Property. 
- The fruits or products derived from the exploitation of a brand or commercial name.  
- The fruits or products derived from the exploitation of an industrial design.  
- The fruits or products derived from the exploitation of a patent, a utility model or an industrial 
property right of analogous nature.  
- The right to receive payment in recompense for the sale or supply of goods or for the provision 
of services, in one single instance or successively, that gives rise to flows of payments of 
recurring or one-off nature, whenever this amount can be known or estimated.  
- The future credit rights corresponding to the income deriving from loans, credits or other types 
of financing, such as those deriving to the financing entity from the dispositions effected by the 
creditor by virtue of contracts of credit.  
- The right of the usufructuary or owner of some other limited real right, in respect of the 
economic value of the usufruct or of the right in question.  
Faced with the deterioration of the economic situation in 2008 (the rise in the price of petroleum, 
the increase in unemployment, and the fall in productivity, among others factors), the  
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Government dictated a series of measures to inject liquidity into the financial system and to 
unblock company financing. The Order PRE/2424/2008, of 14 August, made public an 
Agreement of the Council of Ministers on measures for structural reform and for stimulating the 
financing of small and medium-size companies.  
In this Order, in so far as it affected securitization, it was established that the Institute of Official 
Credit would, in 2009 and 2010, renew to the sum of 5,000 million euros, the line of guarantee to 
those securitization funds whose underlying assets are loans for the acquisition of a protected 
dwelling. The Order also established that the Ministry of Finance would present a proposal, to the 
Government's Delegated Commission for Economic Affairs, to grant guarantees backed by the 
State, to the maximum amount of 3,000 million euros in 2009 and 2010, that would have the 
objective of guaranteeing fixed income securities issued by securitization funds, whose assets are 
loans or credits conceded to small and medium-size companies. 
 
d) Circulars of the Bank of Spain and Community Directives 
In relation to the fall in the accounting value of the securitized assets, it is essential to clarify that 
the  Circular of the Bank of Spain (hereafter the BE) 4/2004, specifying the accounting 
standards of the International Accounting Standard, or IAS, established a relationship between 
the risk really retained by the originator entity and the assets ceded. Except in the case of an asset 
sale in the strict sense, it is very difficult for assets to disappear from the accounts of an entity, 
since the ceding of the assets does not relieve the entity of the associated risks.  
Subsequently, the Circular BE 3/2008, on the determination and monitoring of entities' 
minimum own funds, adapted the Spanish legislation for credit entities to the European  
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Community directives relating to the  access of these entities to securitization activity, and 
relating to capital adequacy. 
The Directive 2009/83/CE, of the European Commission of 27 July 2009, modified certain 
annexes of the Directive 2006/48/CE, of the European Parliament, and of the Council, of 14 
June; particularly notable are the modifications introduced in Annex IX, "Securitization", which 
made specific the circumstances in which it is considered that an entity has transferred a 
significant part of the credit risk in a securitization, whether traditional or synthetic; these 
circumstances are: 
- When the exposures, weighted by risk, of the semi-subordinated (mezzanine) securitization 
positions retained by the originator entity do not exceed 50% of the total of such exposures.  
-When semi-subordinated securitization positions do not exist and when the originator entity does 
not retain more than 20% of the total of the positions that would be subject to deduction of the 
own funds or to a risk weighting of 1.250%. 
Another circumstance in which it could be considered that a significant part of credit risk has 
been transferred is when the supervisory authority has been convinced that the credit entity has in 
place policies and methodologies to ensure that the possible reduction of the capital requirements 
is justified by an agreed transfer of credit risk to third parties (Bank of Spain, 2009). 
 
4. Current situation of the international debt markets  
The crisis of trust, triggered by the events of September 2008 as already commented, affected the 
size and composition of the international markets for debt and, in a very significant way, all 
structured financing, since this concerned the most opaque investments existing, and hence the 
most difficult to understand.   
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This lack of trust, aggravated by the evident deficiencies in the credit ratings awarded by the 
rating agencies (Losada, 2009), set in train a series of consequences, some of which particularly 
affected the securitization market: 
Risk premiums rocketed, leaving the interbank markets practically deserted. 
This in turn provoked the central banks all around the world to flood their financial 
markets with liquidity, since they believed they had no option but to act by assuming the 
role of lenders of last resort. 
The fear that gripped the Stock Exchanges made share prices extremely volatile, and caused the 
widespread collapse of quoted prices at the beginning of 2009. In Spain, the Euribor, 
overwhelmed and at totally atypical levels (figure 13), rose above the corridor of the permanent 
facilities of the ECB and did not return to its normal course until the first quarter of 2009. The 
subsequent injections of liquidity by the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the ECB 
alleviated the situation of lethargy in the interbank market, which was followed by the steepest 
drop in rates known by the ECB since it came into existence, down to 1% in May 2009. Despite 
these events, the distribution of the credit continued to be obstructed, in a situation of liquidity 
trap: the market was inundated with money that, by the breakdown of the mechanism of trust, 
was not flowing and, critically, was not reaching the corporate body of the economy. 
One of the particular measures that the ECB adopted under the strategy of quantitative easing of 
monetary policy was to expand the list of guarantee assets, by reducing the threshold of credit 
quality rating from of A- to BBB-. In this context, the direction of the new securitizations 
underwent a radical change, since the entities began to launch new issues with the object of 
retaining them on their balance sheets, rather than releasing them to the market. The surprising 
growth of these retained securitizations, during the years 2008 and 2009, has its origin, therefore,  
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in their newly-acquired status as assets acceptable as collateral in the liquidity auction operations 
of the central banks.  
Figure 13: Evolution of the Euribor 12 month rate, and interest rates of the ECB, 2008-
2009. 
 
Source: ECB, 2009. 
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This situation has generated a change in the composition of the international markets for debt, 
and has very much affected the securitization sector in particular. Analyzing the data on the size 
of the markets, it is striking that, despite the penalization suffered, these have now increased up to 
the level where the size reached in the stage prior to the crisis has almost been recovered: in 
September 2009 they stood at an outstanding balance of 13.5 billion dollars. 
Figure 15, however, reveals that the structure of the international debt market has not emerged 
unscathed: the proportion of total public debt financing accounted for by securitizations has been 
reduced significantly, with bonds, both public and private, now being in first place. The bank 
rescues and the money released by the governments, in the attempt to return lending activity to 
normality, have caused a level of indebtedness that must be paid for, which is why the issues of 
public debt have taken such a predominant place in the markets. 










Source: Van Rixtel and Romo, 2009.  
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From observing figure 15 we can see the evident preponderance of public sector bonds: they 
account for 49% of total issues, while bonds issued by financial companies have suffered a 
notable contraction, falling from 28% in the third quarter of 2006, to 15% in the same period of 
2009. For their part, syndicated loans have also undergone a relative decrease in their share of 
these markets.  
Focusing on securitizations, it can be confirmed that the CDO's have disappeared and that the 
issues of securitizations, whether originating from the US agencies (who are the biggest issuers) 
or not, have declined from 21% to the current 17%.  
 
5. Current situation and future prospects 
The abuse of securitizations, together with the indiscriminate use made of them, has made it 
impossible to obtain a reliable assessment of the risks to which they are linked. Thus, if anything 
has become evident from the financial crisis, it is precisely the need to increase public control 
over the entities on which the flows of capital and their risk rating depend, that is, the banks, 
intermediaries in general and the international credit rating agencies.  
The new directive 2009/83/CE of the European Commission, which modifies a previous one of 
2006, proposes reforms that will have their principal impact on hedge funds, on financial entities' 
own funds, the rating agencies, systemic risk and financial derivatives. As a result of this 
directive, the banks must have more financial resources available to cover the risks when they 
invest in re-securitizations, and disclose more information on the risks that they are assuming in 
respect of complex products. It is stipulated that the risks derived from securitization operations 
in which the entity acts as investor, originator or sponsor will be valued and supervised by means  
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of the procedures provided in the European regulation, and the correct assessment of those risks 
must be guaranteed.  
New regulations are imposed in respect of entities' own funds, for the activities of securitization, 
and the transparency of the operations is affected. New regulation is also applied to the credit 
rating agencies, aimed at increasing the transparency, to prevent conflicts of interest and to 
regulate how they operate. 
In the USA the Government proposes to limit the risks of a new banking crisis occurring by 
classifying the financial entities more precisely according to their activity, and creating a 
"financial responsibility" tax or fee, in accordance with the size of the entity. The object of this 
last measure is to avoid problems of moral hazard, making the banks responsible for paying for 
the consequences of their actions, and recovering the public money that the Government spent to 
rescue the US banking sector in 2008. 
In summary, the goal of the international authorities is to improve public control of the financial 
system and increase supervision, to prevent the repetition of situations that may put in danger 
international economic stability. 
In the next part, some of the factors that may affect the future of securitization in Spain are 
considered.  
 
The perceived increase in the sovereign risk of Spain 
Investors are demanding higher returns from the Public Treasury for purchasing debt; this has 
caused it to become more expensive compared with what it would have cost in the conditions 
prior to the crisis (the forecast made in the last national Budget is for the issue of 211,500 million 
euros of gross debt).  
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In the first quarter of 2010, the situation has not evolved in the direction expected. Instead, there 
has been a worsening of the international credibility of Spain, and this has generated various 
consequences: 











Source: BANIF. Special markets report of 4 February 2010. 
As can be observed in figure 16, the Spanish bond has become more expensive since the 
beginnings of 2010, increasing its differential against the German bond, possibly due to a failure 
to transmit credibility to the market. As is known, the biggest dangers on this front come from 
Greece. The capacity to transmit reassurance and confidence with respect to the country's plans 
for containing public expenditure, will be fundamental for relieving pressures on the cost of 
financing our public debt. 
In parallel, as was to be expected, the cost of insurance to protect against a possible default of the 
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In February 2010 the total gross value of CDS's exceeded, for the first time, 100,000 million 
dollars (73,000 million euros), according to Markit, the independent company of financial 
information services; this represents an increase of 50% with respect to the value a year ago, and 
Spanish CDS's reached a historical maximum. With regard to premiums, the previous record was 
168 basis points, in February 2009. The difference is that, on this occasion, the problem affects 
not only Greece, Portugal and Italy but also, especially, Spain. See figure 17 on this point. 
 









Source: BANIF. Special markets report of 4 February 2010. 
 
Another consequence of the levels of deficit and debt reached is the penalization suffered on the 
Stock Market, principally by the financial sector. The banks are trying to find an outlet for the 
loans to the property development promoters that they have financed, thus allowing the 
subrogation of mortgages by private individuals despite the situation of unemployment, although 
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that the property assets remaining in the portfolios of the commercial and savings banks have 
been fully sanitized, and by the fear that the rates of default may continue their upward trend, as 
predicted by Standard & Poor’s. It must be remembered that the market feeds on expectations 
and, therefore, that it is crucially important to be able to transmit credibly the assurance that 
banks and other companies have the capacity to contain these problems.  
 
Messages of global organizations and experts 
The messages of various experts, such as Nouriel Roubini and Paul Krugman, who see Spain as a 
burden holding back the Eurozone, and of various investment firms, such as Citi, Nomura and 
Goldman Sachs, who recommend that investors should protect their investments in Spanish debt 
with CDS's, do not help to improve the situation. 
In the "misery index" published by Moody's, a ranking which takes into account the economic 
and social risks derived from the levels of unemployment and fiscal deficit of 16 countries in 
2010, Spain was ranked first, which represents yet another blow to the international prestige of 
the Spanish economy.  
Standard & Poor's dropped the prospects for the qualification of the Spanish sovereign debt from 
stable to negative, around the end of 2009, but also kept its rating as AA+. However, in February 
2010, Moody's announced that it gave credibility to Spain's Plan for Stability; and Fitch, while 
qualifying the Plan as ambitious, has maintained the triple A rating.  
Standard & Poor's has put out a report analyzing the credits that underlie the Spanish mortgage 
securitizations. In September 2009, the proportion of these loans that were in default by more 
than 90 days reached a record of 4.72%, more than double the level recorded a year previously, 
and significantly much higher than the rate of 0.46% recorded in September 2007. Moreover, the  
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strong growth of the Spanish public debt, plus the high rates of unemployment, point to higher 
future rates of default for the securitizations. 
The strategy of some entities, in the face of the falls in the quoted prices of the securitizations in 
circulation, at least merits consideration: they repurchase debt at more than its quoted price, but 
below its issue value (or even above issue value if coverage in derivatives is available), while 
they use the added value obtained to reinforce the core capital (capital and reserves) of which the 
financial sector is so much in need, in line with the new recommendations of the banking 
supervisors. In July 2009, for example, the Bank of Santander earned a sum in excess of 700 
million euros by converting 9,100 million euros in preference shares and bonds.  
Furthermore, the ECB will require a rating from two different agencies before accepting the new 
securitizations as guarantees in the liquidity auctions, from March 2010. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this study an analysis has been made of the current situation in respect of securitization in 
Spain, situating it within its European and world contexts; the various factors that have had, or 
may have, significant effects on its development, in the recent past and in the near future, have 
been analyzed.  
As has been demonstrated, securitization has played an important role in the current financial 
crisis, which has been painted as the most serious since the Great Depression of 1929, and which 
has been characterized by excessive indebtedness and inadequate risk premiums, that is, by 
unjustified tolerance of huge risk or incorrect assessment of risk. 
One of the lessons of the crisis is that investors (that is, investing entities with international 
reputations) did not correctly evaluate the risks associated with the assets underlying ABS, but  
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instead were content to depend almost blindly on the assessments of third parties. In this respect, 
the regulatory regime in Europe supervises securitizations more closely than in the USA; the 
cases in which securitizations can be taken off-balance sheet are restricted; requirements in terms 
of the  transparency of the information disclosed are stricter, to try and ensure that users may 
understand as clearly as possible the exposure of any entity to risk. 
When the crisis erupted, the issue of securitization bonds was not paralyzed, although the purpose 
of such issues did change. Most of these issues have been retained, by the issuers themselves, 
because they have been re-classified as assets acceptable as collateral in the liquidity auction 
operations carried out by the central banks.  
The international debt markets have undergone a substantial change in their composition, with 
bonds, especially those of public debt, now assuming preponderance at the expense of structured 
financing (securitization bonds, credit derivatives and re-securitizations), which has seen a 
notable contraction. However, issues of new securitizations that are being taken up by the 
markets are beginning to appear.  
The perception of the risk inherent in the Spanish national debt has intensified; this is responsible 
for higher costs of financing debt and will make it difficult, in future, to place issues of debt on 
the market, especially if these issues are structured financing. Lastly, it is crucially important to 
transmit confidence, since the valuations that the market makes of the assets issued, and the 
acceptance of these by investors, depends on confidence. In this matter, the role of the 
Government seems to us to be crucial. Not only for the securitisation to act as a financial 
mechanism to grow, but for the interbank market to recover his leadership and the Central Banks 
stop acting as usual lenders.  
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Simplifying securitisation operations and turning to the basic structures could also be an 
incentive to reopen these markets. More transparency, disclosure and standardisation of 
information would surely help to restore confidence. Also, a good regulation plays an important 
role on shaping market patterns and participants behaviours. 
Finally, the best way to control speculation is to exercise extreme supervision, ask for more and 
better information and an effective and appropriate supervisory task. 
 
7. Appendix 
In September 2010, the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) published, via a press release, the 
master lines of what will be a new agreement of capital standards for deposit-taking financial 
entities. This agreement, known popularly as Basle III, would be endorsed by the member 
countries of the G-20 in their November meeting in Korea.  
The new agreement changes radically the structure of the capital requirements for banking 
entities, making them considerably more severe. Thus, the minimum for core capital is raised to 
4.5% instead of the current 2%, and for the so-called TIER 1 capital, the provision becomes 6%, 
instead of the ruling 4%, always as proportions of total risk-weighted assets. The original capital 
ratio of 8% is maintained, so the TIER 2 requirement becomes 2%. In addition, a capital 
conservation buffer of 2.5% is added to absorb losses in the event of periods of turbulence and 
stress in the financial system.  
In short, the capital requirements are increased to 10.5% of total risk-weighted assets; of this, 
8.5% (that is, the TIER 1 and the buffer) must be covered by shares or similar assets. But, further, 
a counter cyclical buffer is also foreseen; this can reach 2.5%, and is intended to protect the 
banking sector from periods of excessive credit expansion.   
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It is also intended to establish leverage ratios, liquidity coverage and net stable funding: all of 
these are still to be defined and quantified.  
Given the magnitude of the changes proposed, a calendar is stipulated for the progressive 
implementation of the new standards, which runs to January 2019. Therefore we are facing a 
profound reform of the measures of solvency for these entities, and must live with the uncertainty 
generated by a time horizon as long as eight years.  
The consequences for the banking system of the industrialised countries, to which Basle III will 
apply, and for the Spanish banks in particular, may be considerable. In Spain, the capital amounts 
necessary to cover the requirements of the new agreement are calculated at some 45,000 million 
euros; this could lead the entities affected to need massive expansions of share capital. In 
addition, it will be more complicated for the savings banks, since they will probably need to 
resort to the issue of preferred shares with voting rights.  
However, all these changes described should translate into more secure and solvent but less 
profitable banks, and hence into less abundant and more expensive loans.  
With respect to the securitization of assets, at this point in time it is difficult to pronounce on the 
possible effects of Basle III, but some educated guesses can be made. The policy of quantitative 
easing of the European Central Bank, cheap money at 1% and in practically unlimited quantities 
if the entities present sufficient guarantee assets, has resulted in entities maintaining securitized 
assets on their balance sheets in order to be able to take part in the corresponding auctions for 
liquidity. But the policy of quantitative easing cannot continue forever and, when it stops, the 
practice of securitizing to obtain guarantee assets may cease to have the relevance it has had to 
date.   
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On the other hand, according to Cardone, Samaniego and Trujillo (2010), in the period 2000-
2007, the Spanish commercial and savings banks have utilized securitization for reasons of 
liquidity and efficiency, and not for the motives of transferring credit risk to others and of 
reducing the regulatory capital required. In addition, Spanish regulations make it difficult to take 
securitized assets off the balance sheet, particularly after the issue of circular 4/2004 of the Bank 
of Spain.  
In the BIS communication of September 2010, mentioned at the beginning of this appendix, there 
is a passing reference to the capital requirements for securitization activities that should be 
introduced at the end of 2011. Obviously, we will have to wait to see the new proposals, and 
these will also need to be enacted in the legislation of each country in question.  
In summary, greater requirements of capital, not only in quantity but also in quality, now appear 
on the horizon for the deposit-taking entities of the developed countries covered by the Basle III 
agreement. The effects of the new regulation, in the best of cases, will be seen both in the 
conventional activities of the banks and in their securitization practices.  
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